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LEGITIMATE JUSTICE: 
USING CLEMENCY TO ADDRESS MASS INCARCERATION 
 
Sanjay K. Chhablani* 
 
 Stephanie George, a single mother with three young children, 
was convicted of conspiracy to distribute cocaine after police found a 
lockbox containing a half-kilogram of cocaine in her home.  The trial 
judge acknowledged her limited role in the crime, noting that “[e]ven 
though you have been involved in drugs and drug dealing, your role 
has basically been as a girlfriend and bag holder and money holder but 
not actively involved in the drug dealing.”1  Moreover, that crime, and 
her two prior convictions for minor drug sales ($40 and $120), were 
non-violent.  Nevertheless, contrary to his own sense of the 
appropriate punishment, the judge was compelled by the federal 
sentencing guidelines to sentence Stephanie to life imprisonment 
without the possibility of parole.2 
 
 Stephanie’s incarceration occurred during a time when the 
population of persons incarcerated in state and federal prisons 
mushroomed.  Over a period of three decades, the number of persons 
incarcerated quadrupled to over two million,3 with the population of 
federal inmates growing an even more stunning eight-fold during that 
period.4  If persons on parole or probation are also counted, almost 7 
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1 See John Tierney, For Lesser Crimes, Rethinking Life Behind Bars, N.Y. Times 
(Dec. 11, 2012), http://nyti.ms/UzqpOy. 
2 The trial judge, Judge Roger Vinson, said that Stephanie’s conduct “certainly in my 
judgment . . . does not warrant a life sentence.  Id. 
3 See E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 
1991–2012 1 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p12tar9112.pdf  (noting 
“between 1978 and 2009, the number of prisoners held in federal and state facilities 
in the United States increased almost 430%, from 294,400 on December 31, 1978, to 
1,555,600 on December 31, 2009.”).  
4 See James Cole, Deputy U.S. Att’y Gen., Remarks at the New York State Bar 
Association Annual Meeting (Jan. 30, 2014), 
http://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/remarks-prepared-delivery-deputy-attorney-
general-james-cole-new-york-state-bar (last visited on Aug. 6, 2015) (“[O]ver the 
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million persons, or 1 out of every 31 adults in the country, are under 
correctional supervision.5  
 
 There has been growing recognition that this mass 
incarceration has come at an unsustainably high cost both in human6 
and economic7 terms.  There is also recognition that theses high costs 
may not justify the benefits since the never-ceasing increase in mass 
incarceration seems to have a diminishing utility in stemming crime.8  
As an editorial in a leading news publication observed, “[f]or more 
than a decade, researchers across multiple disciplines have been 
issuing reports on the widespread societal and economic damage 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
last thirty years, the federal prison population has increased at a staggering rate of 
800 percent—currently totaling nearly 216,000 inmates.”). 
5 LAUREN E. GLAZE & DANIELLE KAEBLE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CORRECTIONAL POPULATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 3 (2013), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cpus13.pdf.  (last visited on August 6, 2015).  
6 See CHRISTIAN HENRICHSON & RUTH DELANEY, VERA INST. OF JUSTICE, THE PRICE 
OF PRISONS: WHAT INCARCERATION COSTS TAXPAYERS 3 (2012), 
http://www.vera.org/sites/default/files/resources/downloads/Price_of_Prisons_updat
ed_version_072512.pdf. Further, 
Incarcerated men and women also bear economic and social costs 
associated with prison—as do their families and communities. As a 
2005 study concluded, “Incarceration impacts the life of a family 
in several important ways: it strains them financially, disrupts 
parental bonds, separates spouses, places severe stress on the 
remaining caregivers, leads to a loss of discipline in the household, 
and to feelings of shame, stigma, and anger.” 
Id. 
7 Id. at 9 (“Among the 40 states surveyed, representing more than 1.2 million 
inmates (of 1.4 million total people incarcerated in all 50 state prison systems), the 
total per-inmate cost averaged $31,286 and ranged from $14,603 in Kentucky to 
$60,076 in New York.”) 
8 Id. at 13 (“A growing body of research suggests—and government officials 
acknowledge—that beyond a certain point, further increases in incarceration have 
significantly diminishing returns as a means of making communities safer.”).  In 
fact, since there are limited financial resources, excessive money spent on 
corrections diverts necessary resources from crime prevention and prosecution, 
thereby counterintuitively endangering public safety.  See Cole, supra note 4 
(“[T]here is a basic truth that dollars are finite.  Every dollar we spend at the 
Department of Justice on prisons - and last year we spent about $6.5 billion on 
prisons - is a dollar we cannot spend supporting our prosecutors and law 
enforcement agents in their fight against violent crime, drug cartels, public 
corruption, financial fraud, human trafficking, and child exploitation, just to mention 
a few.  In other words, if we don’t find a solution to the federal prison population 
problem, public safety is going to suffer.”) 
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caused by America’s now 40-year experiment in locking up vast 
numbers of its citizens.”9  “[O]verwhelming evidence shows a crisis 
that threatens society as a whole . . . [and] those who study the 
problem have called for immediate correction,” the editorial 
continued. 
 
 It is in this context that, on December 19, 2013, almost 
seventeen years after Stephanie’s conviction, President Obama 
commuted her sentence, along with those of seven other federal 
inmates who had been convicted of non-violent drug offenses.10  Then, 
about a month later, the Department of Justice (“DOJ”) announced a 
new initiative aimed at identifying similarly situated inmates to 
recommend for clemency consideration.11 
 
 In Part I, this paper provides an overview of President 
Obama’s clemency initiative.  In Part II, it explores the potential of the 
clemency initiative to address mass incarceration in the short term, 
discussing three significant limitations.  In Part III, this paper explores 
the long term efficacy of the clemency initiative, addressing key 
claims levied by critics challenging the legitimacy of the clemency 
initiative; in addition, recognizing that critics may be driven by a 
justifiable angst about unbridled executive power, the paper discusses 
the restraints that limit the exercise of the President’s clemency power. 
 
I. PRESIDENT OBAMA’S CLEMENCY INITIATIVE 
 
 On January 30, 2014, Deputy Attorney General James Cole 
addressed the New York State Bar Association Annual Meeting.12  
After providing an overview of the DOJ’s ongoing three-pronged 
strategy for addressing mass incarceration—crime prevention, 
alternatives to incarceration, and reentry—he spoke about the potential 
use of executive clemency powers to also address the problem.  He 
added that “[i]t is the Department’s goal to find additional candidates, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
9 Editorial, End Mass Incarceration Now, N.Y. TIMES (May 24, 2014), 
http://nyti.ms/1jNhRq2. 
10 Charlie Savage, Obama Commutes Sentences for 8 in Crack Cocaine Cases, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 19, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/12/20/us/obama-commuting-
sentences-in-crack-cocaine-cases.html. 
11 Matt Apuzzo, Justice Dept. Starts Quest for Inmates to Be Freed, N.Y. TIMES 
(Jan. 31, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1fePWc8. 
12 See Cole, supra note 4. 
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who are similarly situated to the eight granted clemency last year, and 
recommend them to the President for clemency consideration.”13 
 
 A few months later, Mr. Cole provided further guidance about 
the clemency initiative, specifying the criteria that the DOJ would use 
“when reviewing and expediting clemency applications from federal 
inmates.”14  Specifically, under the clemency initiative, the DOJ will 
prioritize processing clemency applications that meet all of the 
following criteria: (1) the inmate is currently serving a federal 
sentence in prison and has served at least 10 years of her/his sentence; 
(2) the inmate likely would have received a substantially lower 
sentence if convicted of the same offense(s) under the guidelines in 
effect today; (3) the inmate is a non-violent, low-level offender 
without significant ties to large scale criminal organizations, gangs or 
cartels and without a significant criminal history; and (4) the inmate 
has demonstrated good conduct in prison and has no history of 
violence prior to or during the current term of imprisonment.15 
 
 While this clemency initiative is not expressly directed at 
inmates convicted of drug and weapons offenses, in practice that is the 
population most likely to be impacted.  Of the broadly four categories 
of crimes for which federal inmates were convicted16—violent crimes, 
property crimes, public order offenses and drug offenses—the roughly 
13,600 inmates convicted of violent offenses17 are categorically 
ineligible for the clemency initiative.  While the 11,500 federal 
inmates convicted of property crimes18 are not similarly categorically 
excluded, in practice they are highly unlikely to be eligible for 
clemency because the mean sentence for property offenses is 29 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 Id. 
14 Announcing New Clemency Initiative, Deputy Attorney General James M. Cole 
Details Broad New Criteria for Applicants, DEP’T OF JUSTICE OFFICE OF PUB. 
AFFAIRS (Apr. 23, 2014), http://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/announcing-new-clemency-
initiative-deputy-attorney-general-james-m-cole-details-broad-new. 
15 Id. See also, Matt Apuzzo, Justice Dept. Expands Eligibility for Clemency, N.Y. 
TIMES (Apr. 24, 2014), http://nyti.ms/1tC4Wd2. 
16 E. ANN CARSON, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2013, 17 table 15 (2014), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/p13.pdf. 
(last visited on Aug. 6, 2015) [Hereinafter BJS: Prisoners in 2013].  
17 Id.  
18 Id.  
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months,19 far below the 10-year minimum time-served criteria of the 
clemency initiative.  The third category of federal inmates, those 
convicted of public order offenses, include those who have committed 
immigration offenses and those who have committed weapons 
offenses.20  Since the average sentence of those convicted of illegal 
entry into the United States is about two years,21 inmates in the 
immigration subset of public order offenses too appear unlikely to be 
eligible for the clemency initiative.  Those convicted of weapons 
offenses, on the other hand, receive a mean sentence of 88 months,22 
putting them in the general ambit of the clemency initiative.  Finally, 
those convicted of drug offenses, the mean sentence for which is 87 
months,23 too appear to fall in the general ballpark of the clemency 
initiative’s criteria.  
 
II. THE SHORT TERM EFFICACY OF THE CLEMENCY INITIATIVE 
 
 The implicit focus of the clemency initiative on these two 
categories of offenses (namely, drug offenses and weapons offenses), 
has the potential to impact a significant number of inmates.24  There 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
19 SEAN ROSENMERKEL, MATTHEW DUROSE, & DONALD FAROLE, JR., U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN STATE COURTS, 
2006, 9 Table 1.6 (2009), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/fssc06st.pdf.  (last 
visited on Aug. 6, 2015) [Hereinafter Felony Sentences in State Courts]. 
20 BJS: Prisoners in 2013, supra note 16.  
21 Michael T. Light, Mark Hugo Lopez & Ana Gonzalez-Barrera, The Rise of 
Federal Immigration Crimes, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Mar. 18, 2014), 
http://www.pewhispanic.org/2014/03/18/the-rise-of-federal-immigration-crimes/. 
The authors note that 
[d]ramatic growth over the past two decades in the number of 
offenders sentenced in federal courts has been driven primarily by 
enforcement of a particular immigration offense—unlawful reentry 
into the United States. . . . The increase in unlawful reentry 
convictions alone accounts for nearly half (48%) of the growth in 
the total number of offenders sentenced in federal courts [from 
1992 to 2012].”  
Id. 
22 Felony Sentences in State Courts, supra note 19. 
23 Id. 
24 The focus on drug offenders is conceptually sound in so far as “the single largest 
driver in the increase in the federal prison population since 1998 has been longer 
sentences for drug offenders.” Ezra Klein & Evan Soltas, Wonkbook: 11 Facts About 
America’s Prison Population, WASH. POST (Aug. 13, 2013), 
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are about 98,200 federal inmates convicted of drug offenses and 
30,000 federal inmates convicted of weapons offenses.25  These 
inmates account for about 66% of all federal inmates.26  As such, the 
clemency initiative bears promise for addressing the problem of over-
incarceration in federal prisons. 
 
There are, however, three significant constraints that may prevent the 
clemency initiative from meeting its full potential prior to the end of 
President Obama’s term in office: logistical limitations, overly 
restrictive criteria, and poor structural design.  
 
 First, the manner in which the clemency initiative is being 
administered raises significant logistical issues.  After the clemency 
initiative was announced, the Bureau of Prisons circulated a 
questionnaire seeking to identify eligible inmates.27  Over 30,000 
inmates responded.28  Screening these prospective applicants to 
identify those who meet the criteria for the clemency initiative, and 
then preparing clemency petitions for those who do appear to meet the 
criteria, will require the assistance of counsel.29  In response to this 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonkblog/wp/2013/08/13/wonkbook-11-
facts-about-americas-prison-population/. 
25 See BJS: Prisoners in 2013, supra note 16. 
26 There were 103,775 inmates in federal custody in 2013. See BJS: Prisoners in 
2013, supra note 16. 
27 BOP Supports DOJ Clemency Initiative, FED. BUREAU OF PRISONS (May 6, 2014, 
5:30 PM), 
http://www.bop.gov/resources/news/20140506_DOJ_clemency_initiative.jsp. The 
Notice that was circulated by the Bureau to inmates is available at 
http://www.bop.gov/resources/news/pdfs/Notice_to_Inmates_Initiative_on_Executiv
e_Clemency.pdf.  
28 Peter Baker, Obama Plans Broader Use of Clemency to Free Nonviolent Drug 
Offenders, N.Y. TIMES (July 3, 2015), http://nyti.ms/1RX1lji. 
29 This is because demonstrating that the inmate would likely have been sentenced to 
a lower prison term under the current sentencing guidelines—one of the criteria for 
the clemency initiative—likely will require a complicated analysis of federal 
sentencing law. Likewise, while the clemency criteria exclude inmates who have 
been convicted of violent crimes, it is not clear what crimes constitutes crimes of 
violence. Nor is it clear whether an inmate who has engaged in violent conduct 
during their incarceration, another seemingly disqualifying criteria, might be able to 
present mitigating factors. Even a seemingly straight-forward criteria such as having 
already served 10 years can be potentially complicated. For example, if the inmate 
served time in state prison for the same conduct, it is not clear how that would be 
factored into the analysis.  
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need for the assistance of a large number of attorneys, the American 
Bar Association and a group of non-profit organizations have 
collaborated to create Clemency Project 2014 (“CP2014”).30  The goal 
of CP2014 is to screen these inmates and identify those who actually 
meet the criteria for relief.  Then, working with trained pro bono 
attorneys, CP2014 will submit clemency petitions.31  While many law 
firms, lawyers, and law schools are participating in CP2014, there has 
been concern about insufficient numbers of pro bono lawyers available 
for this task and the slow pace of the review.32  Moreover, while the 
Federal Public and Community Defenders initially participated in the 
creation of CP2014, their participation has since been restricted.33 
 
 Another logistical problem is the difficulty in collecting the 
information necessary to screen cases.  Since each potential case is at 
least 10 years old (in keeping with the clemency initiative’s criteria), it 
is often difficult to get the case file from the inmate’s trial attorney.34  
Moreover 
 
[M]any of the cases require an in-person trip to a 
courthouse because older documents are not on 
PACER.  Even tougher to get are the presentence 
investigative reports, or PSRs, which are usually sealed. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
30 Op-Ed., Cynthia W. Roseberry, Clemency Project Gears Up, N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 1, 
2014), http://nyti.ms/1toZ1Kn.  The other organizations involved are the American 
Civil Liberties Union, Families Against Mandatory Minimums and the National 
Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers. Id. 
31 See Lorelei Laird, Clemency Project 2014 Is Out To Help Prisoners Doing 
Excessive Time Due To Inflexible Sentencing, ABA JOURNAL (July 1, 2015), 
http://www.abajournal.com/magazine/article/clemency_project_2014_is_out_to_hel
p_prisoners_doing_excessive_time. 
32 See Gregory Korte, Obama Administration Clemency Push Gets Slow Start, USA 
TODAY (June 1, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/05/31/obama-clemency-
initiative/27963853/. 
33 See Alia Malek, Federal Defenders Barred From Massive Clemency Drive, AL-
JAZEERA (Aug. 1, 2014), http://alj.am/1u7XhT5; see also Will Baude, What 
Authority Do Judge Bates’s Letters Have?, The Volokh Conspiracy, WASH. POST 
(Aug. 21, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/volokh-
conspiracy/wp/2014/08/21/what-authority-do-judge-batess-letters-have/. 
34 Laird, supra note 31. 
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. . . [A] handful of judges have denied requests to 
unseal them; and in one case, a prosecutor opposed it.35 
 
 The bottleneck in the initial screening process has been 
compounded by the prospect of a lengthy review at the DOJ.  The DOJ 
has requested that all clemency petitions be submitted by January 2016 
to give the DOJ and the President adequate time to act on each 
request.36  Given the large number of potential clemency applicants 
and the short amount of time, unless there is a ramp up in legal 
resources, it is likely that the clemency initiative may not reach its 
potential.37  
 
 Second, the criteria for the clemency initiative have restricted 
its scope.  For example, while 30,000 federal inmates have self-
identified as being eligible for relief under the clemency initiative, this 
only represents less than a third of all federal inmates incarcerated for 
drug-related offenses and only about 15% of the total number of 
federal inmates.  This might be because many inmates have been 
rendered ineligible by the requirement that inmates have finished 
serving 10 years in prison.38  
 
 Third, the Obama Administration’s decision to keep the 
clemency initiative under the auspices of the Pardon Attorney and the 
DOJ may well prove to be a critical problem in its effectiveness.  As 
scholars have observed, not only does this structural framework seem 
unsuitable for the task of processing large numbers of clemency 
applications in the short time remaining until President Obama’s term 
expires, but it also builds in the potential for conflict of interest and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 Id. 
36 Gregory Korte, ‘The Clock Is Running’ On Obama Clemency Initiative, USA 
TODAY (June 24, 2015) 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2015/06/24/clemency-initiative-clock-
is-running/29128091/. 
37 Recent developments do not bode well.  In early June 2015, the House of 
Representatives adopted the Marino Amendment, barring the Department of Justice 
from using funds for Clemency Project 2014 or for bolstering the capabilities of the 
Pardon Attorney’s office.  See Professor Mark Osler’s Informed Perspective On 
Recent Federal Clemency Developments, SENTENCING LAW AND POLICY (June 4, 
2015, 12:08 AM), 
http://sentencing.typepad.com/sentencing_law_and_policy/2015/06/professor-mark-
oslers-informed-perspective-on-recent-federal-clemency-developments.html. 
38 See Laird, supra note 31. 
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cognitive bias on the part of the DOJ attorneys tasked with reviewing 
the clemency petitions.39   
 
 Recent history justifies these concerns.  As the Inspector 
General found, Ronald Rodgers, the former Pardon Attorney had 
deliberately misled President Bush with regard to Clarence Aaron’s 
clemency application.40  Rodgers, who had previously served as a 
military judge and major drug crimes prosecutor, was fired in April 
2014.41  More recently, the public opposition to the clemency initiative 
by the National Association of Assistant U.S. Attorneys,42 raises 
concern since these attorneys may well be among those tasked at the 
DOJ to review clemency petitions. 
 
 One potential solution is to “recreate a pardon reviewing 
authority either outside of the Department of Justice, as part of the 
executive Office of the President, or as a direct function of the 
Attorney General as the President ’s personal representative.”43  In 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See See Op-Ed., Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, The President’s Idle Executive 
Power: Pardoning, WASH. POST (Nov. 26, 2014), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/the-presidents-idle-executive-power-
pardoning/2014/11/26/3934ab1c-71aa-11e4-8808-afaa1e3a33ef_story.html (“What 
is broken is no mystery. The key gatekeepers for this process are in the Justice 
Department—the same agency that prosecutes federal crimes. Unsurprisingly, the 
department has been reluctant to second-guess its own decisions and rarely 
recommends that the White House approve a clemency petition.”); see also, Alafair 
S. Burke, Prosecutorial Agnosticism, 8 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 79, 97 (2010) (“A 
prosecutor’s personal belief that the defendant is guilty can also continue to interfere 
with neutral decision making after the defendant has been convicted.”).  
40 See Dafna Linzer, Pardon Attorney Misrepresented Facts to White House in 
Clarence Aaron Case, PBS.ORG (Dec. 18, 2012), 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/criminal-justice/report-pardon-attorney-
misrepresented-facts-to-white-house-in-clarence-aaron-case/. Aaron was one of the 
eight inmates whose sentence was commuted by President Obama in December 
2013. 
41 See Dafna Linzer, Justice Finally Comes to the Pardons Office and Perhaps to 
Many Inmates, MSNBC (Apr. 23, 2014), http://on.msnbc.com/QyjNpK. 
42 See Steve Cook, Drug Laws Keep Our Nation Safe: Opposing View, USA TODAY 
(Jul.16, 2015), http://www.usatoday.com/story/opinion/2015/07/16/mandatory-
minimum-sentencing-drug-trafficking-editorials-debates/30262641/. 
43 See Paul Rosenzweig, A Federalist Conception of the Pardon Power, THE 
HERITAGE FOUNDATION (Dec. 4, 2012) available at 
http://www.heritage.org/research/reports/2012/12/a-federalist-conception-of-the-
pardon-power (last visited on Aug. 6, 2015). Margaret Colgate Love has argued that 
the federal pardon process can be reinvigorated by focusing on three key issues: 
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addition, this new reviewing authority should be staffed with a broad 
variety of personnel including “prosecutors, sociologists, 
psychologists, historians, and even defense attorneys.”44  Even if the 
Pardon Office is not moved out of the Department of Justice, the 
President can convene a special Pardon Board for administering the 
clemency initiative.  This would be akin to the Presidential Clemency 
Board set up by President Ford to process the applications for 
clemency for offenses related to the draft.45  Those Board members 
selected from outside the DOJ reviewed over 21,000 applications for 
clemency in just one year.46 
 
 Absent amelioration of these resource constraints, restrictive 
criteria and structural design, there is a very real possibility that the 
clemency initiative may not meet its potential of impacting mass 
incarceration.  Indeed, even with the 46 commutations by President 
Obama in July 2015, there have been less than 90 commutations in the 
fifteen months since the initiative was announced.47 
 
 
 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
authority, accountability and transparency. See Margaret Colgate Love, 
Reinvigorating the Federal Pardon Process: What the President Can Learn From 
the States, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 730, 751 (2012). Doug Berman similarly has called 
for the President to form a “Clemency Commission” headed by a “Clemency Czar” 
to “improve the functioning, transparency, and public respect for executive 
clemency.” Douglas A. Berman, Turning Hope-And-Change Talk Into Clemency 
Action For Nonviolent Drug Offenders, 36 NEW ENG. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. 
CONFINEMENT 59, 72 (2010); See also Evan P. Schultz, Does the Fox Control 
Pardons in the Henhouse, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 177 (2001) (arguing that the 
influence of prosecutors over the pardon process should be reduced and moved 
instead into the White House); Brian M. Hoffstadt, Guarding the Integrity of the 
Clemency Power, 13 FED. SENT’G REP. 180 (2001) (arguing that clemency cases 
should remain in the Justice Department, but that the process should be restructured 
so as to restore the Attorney General’s role). 
44 Id. 
45 See Mark Osler & Matthew Fass, The Ford Approach and Real Fairness for Crack 
Convicts, 23 FED. SENT’G REP 228, 228 (2011). 
46 Id. 
47 David Jackson & Gregory Korte, Obama's Clemency Grant Largest Since the 
1960s, USA TODAY (Jul. 13, 2015), 
http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/07/13/obama-clemency-46-men-and-
women-facebook/30086127/). 
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III. THE LONG TERM EFFICACY OF THE CLEMENCY INITIATIVE 
 
 President Obama’s clemency initiative has the potential to 
affect mass incarceration even after his term expires by serving as a 
model for future presidents.  This long-term efficacy of the clemency 
initiative, however, is predicated on the acceptance of its legitimacy as 
an enterprise.  Absent popular acceptance, the willingness of future 
administrations to use the pardon power in such a manner would be 
significantly diminished.48  
 
 Since its inception, mirroring the reflexive and incessant, and 
yet quite calculated and deliberate, opposition to almost every 
administrative program,49 critics have sought to delegitimize President 
Obama’s clemency initiative.  In particular, they have made three 
claims about the clemency initiative that have the potential for 
undermining its popular acceptance. As discussed below, none of 
these claims is compelling. 
 
 First, some critics have assailed the clemency initiative, which 
has the potential of affecting thousands of inmates, as being 
unprecedented.  As a factual matter, however, this claim is unfounded.  
Clemency has been an integral part of the day-to-day operation of the 
federal justice system for much of our history.50  From the early days 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 As scholars have pointed out, the much maligned use of the pardon power by 
Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush at the end of their second terms, and the 
public uproar that ensued, has had a chilling effect on the practices of future 
administrations.  See, e.g., Margaret Colgate Love, The Twilight of the Pardon 
Power, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1169, 1212 (2010). 
49 James Wolcott, The Conspiracy to Commit Legislative Constipation, VANITY FAIR 
(Apr. 27, 2012), http://www.vanityfair.com/culture/2012/03/The-Conspiracy-to-
Commit-Legislative-Constipation (noting that on the night of President Obama’s 
inauguration, at a private dinner of leading Republicans, Kevin McCarthy, the House 
Republican Chief Deputy Whip, was quoted as saying that “"If you act like you're 
the minority, you're going to stay in the minority . . .  . [W]e've gotta challenge them 
on every single bill and challenge them on every single campaign.”). The following 
year, then Senate Minority Leader Mitch McConnell said that “[t]he single most 
important thing we want to achieve is for President Obama to be a one-term 
president.” Jonathan Capehart, Republicans Had It In For Obama Before Day 1, 
WASH. POST. (Aug. 10, 2012), https://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/post-
partisan/post/republicans-had-it-in-for-obama-before-day-1/2012/08/10/0c96c7c8-
e31f-11e1-ae7f-d2a13e249eb2_blog.html). 
50 See, e.g., Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 411–12 (1993) (“Clemency is deeply 
rooted in our Anglo-American tradition of law . . . .”). See also Margaret Colgate 
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of the Founding, “at a time when the laws were relatively harsh and 
inflexible, the presidential pardon power was virtually the only way 
that federal offenders could have their convictions reviewed, prison 
sentences reduced, and rights of citizenship restored.”51  Indeed, by the 
turn of the nineteenth century, over 40 percent of federal prisoners 
received clemency.52  And while it is true that the clemency initiative 
is a marked departure from the clemency practices of the past few 
presidents (beginning primarily with President Reagan’s second 
term53), “until 1980, each president granted well over a hundred post-
sentence pardons and sentence commutations almost every year, 
without fanfare or scandal.”54   
 
 Second, some critics have attacked the clemency initiative for 
granting relief to an entire class of defendants rather than being 
individually tailored to correct injustices in particular cases.55  As an 
initial matter, this claim appears to be a misreading of the criteria for 
relief.  While having a non-violent drug conviction is a necessary pre-
requisite under the initiative, it is not a sufficient condition for relief.  
Rather, once the population of potential inmates with the qualifying 
conviction is identified, there must be individual-specific findings of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Love, Of Pardons, Politics and Collar Buttons: Reflections on the President's Duty 
to be Merciful, 27 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1483 (2000). 
51 Margaret Colgate Love, Reinventing the President's Pardon Power, 20 FED. 
SENT'G REP. 5, 6 (2007). 
52 Id. at 6 n.12. (“In his classic 1941 study of federal pardoning practices, W.H. 
Humbert reported that between 1860 and 1900, 49 percent of all applications for 
presidential pardon were granted. In 1896 there averaged 64 acts of pardon for every 
100 prisoners, and in the next five years the ratio between acts of clemency and the 
federal prison population was, on average, 43 percent.”) (citation omitted). 
53 Love, supra note 51, at 7. 
54 Id. See also Victoria J. Palacios, Faith in Fantasy, 49 VAND. L. REV. 311, 348–49 
(1996) (“The presidential clemency power has atrophied in the last half century. 
President Johnson granted over seventy clemencies per year at the beginning of his 
term. When he was criticized for one in particular, the number was reduced to only 
five over the remaining eighteen months of his presidency. President Nixon granted 
thirty-six percent of all requests for clemency; President Ford awarded twenty-seven 
percent; and President Carter just over twenty-one percent. President Bush granted 
fewer clemencies during his tenure than most presidents in the past twenty-five 
years.”) 
55 Letter from House Judiciary Committee to Loretta Lynch, Att’y Gen., U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice (July 14, 2015), http://judiciary.house.gov/_cache/files/9364ee67-373d-
48a4-9cae-a20932eb5145/071415-clemency-letter.pdf [Hereinafter House Judiciary 
Committee Letter]. 
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good behavior and lack of violent history during the minimum 10 
years of incarceration.56 
 
 In any event, even if the clemency initiative were to be used to 
grant relief based on a group characteristic, it would be consistent with 
historical practice.57  For example, intending “to send a message to 
Congress, Presidents Kennedy and Johnson commuted the sentences 
of more than 200 drug offenders serving mandatory minimum 
sentences under the Narcotics Control Act of 1956.”58  President 
Carter too granted clemency for an entire class: “during his first full 
day in office, [he] pardoned those who had evaded the draft during the 
Vietnam War in an effort to ‘bind the wounds that an unpopular war 
had inflicted on society and on its young people, so that healing could 
begin.’”59  This action bore striking resemblance to that of President 
Lincoln who, a little over a hundred years earlier, had granted 
clemency to dozens of deserters.60  Indeed this practice of mass 
clemency has roots back to President Washington.61 
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 See supra Part I. 
57 See Charles Shanor & Marc Miller, Pardon Us: Systematic Presidential Pardons, 
13 FED. SENT. REP. 139 (2001) (“At least a third of all United States presidents, 
including many of our greatest presidents, and from the earliest administrations, 
have used systematic pardons.”); id. at 140 (chronicling the use of the pardon power 
for public policy purposes from 1795 to 1977). 
58 Love, supra note 51, at 6. 
59 Jonathan T. Menitove, The Problematic Presidential Pardon: A Proposal For 
Reforming Federal Clemency, 3 HARV. L. & POL'Y REV. 447, 453 (2009) (citing 
KATHLEEN DEAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY, AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 
81–82 (1989)). 
60Rosenzweig, supra note 43. President Lincoln’s decision in 1862 to grant reprieve 
to 265 Dakota prisoners sentenced to death “constituted the largest mass clemency of 
people sentenced to death in American history.” Paul Finkelman, “I Could Not 
Afford to Hang Men For Votes:” Lincoln the Lawyer, Humanitarian Concerns, and 
the Dakota Pardons, 39 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 405, 409 (2013). 
61 Daniel T. Kobil, The Quality of Mercy Strained: Wresting the Pardoning Power 
From the King, 69 TEX. L. REV. 569, 592 (1991) (“In 1795, President Washington 
granted an unconditional pardon to many of the participants in the Pennsylvania 
Whiskey Rebellion.”).  Moreover, “John Adams, in order to serve “the public good,” 
likewise issued a presidential pardon to all persons involved in an insurrection in 
Pennsylvania.” Id. And, “[a]fter the Federalists were soundly defeated in the election 
of 1800, President Jefferson utilized the clemency power to pardon all those 
convicted and sentenced under the Alien and Sedition Act . . . .” Id. at 592-93. 
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 Third, some critics have claimed that the clemency initiative 
represents a “usurpation of the lawmaking authority of the Legislative 
branch.”62  Initially, it bears noting that this critique is ironic since 
many of these critics had previously been proponents of a robust 
understanding of presidential power and the unitary executive 
theory.63  
 
 That aside, rather than an undermining of a legislative 
judgment, the clemency initiative is better understood as an effort by 
the Executive Branch to provide review and oversight of earlier 
Executive Branch decisions.  Namely, the President’s exercise of his 
pardon powers through this clemency initiative is a necessary and 
appropriate action for ameliorating the harsh consequences that have 
stemmed in part from the charging, pleading, and sentencing practices 
of the prosecutors in the affected cases.64 
 
 Over the past few decades, developments in the criminal 
justice system, particularly in plea bargaining and sentencing, 
combined with the virtually unrestricted discretion in policing and 
charging decisions, have resulted in a significant shift in power from 
the judicial and legislative branches of government to the executive.65  
Prosecutors in particular have come to wield enormous power, 66 the 
largely unrestricted exercise of which has been a key driver of much of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
62 House Judiciary Committee Letter, supra note 55. 
63 See Christopher S. Yoo et al., The Unitary Executive in the Modern Era, 1945-
2004, 90 IOWA L. REV. 601 (2005); Julian E. Zelizer, The Conservative Embrace of 
Presidential Power, 88 B.U. L. REV. 499 (2008). 
64 Rachel E. Barkow, Clemency and Presidential Administration of Criminal Law, 
90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 802, 807 (2015) (Clemency can be “a key presidential oversight 
mechanism for keeping federal criminal law enforcement in check.”). See also 
Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390, 415 (1993) (“Executive clemency has provided the 
“fail safe” in our criminal justice system.”) 
65 Robert L. Misner, Recasting Prosecutorial Discretion, 86 J. CRIM. L. & 
CRIMINOLOGY 717, 718 (1996) (“In the past thirty years, the diffusion of 
responsibility has begun to abate and power has increasingly come to rest in the 
office of the prosecutor. Developments in the areas of charging, plea bargaining, and 
sentencing have made the prosecutor the preeminent actor in the system.”). 
66 Id. at 741–42. (“Although the discretion given to the legislature, to the police, and 
to prison officials is broad and immensely important, the prosecutor has become the 
most powerful office in the criminal justice system. The prosecutor's authority is 
evident in bail hearings, grants of immunity, and in trial strategy. But in the areas of 
charging, bargaining, and sentencing, it has become clear that the prosecutor plays 
the pivotal role in the criminal justice process.”). 
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the mass incarceration of the past quarter century.67  By seeking to 
adjust the punishment imposed on non-violent drug offenders who 
have already served significant prison sentences,68 the clemency 
initiative is part of a broader Presidential enterprise using enforcement 
discretion as a policymaking tool.69  Indeed, given the dysfunctional 
state of legislature, such Presidential action may be the only pragmatic 
course of action.70 
 
 Thus, while the President’s exercise of clemency sometimes 
are rightly seen as the granting of mercy,71 the clemency initiative is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
67 See, e.g., Ronald F. Wright, Sentencing Climate Change and the Infrastructure of 
Finality, 4 WAKE FOREST J.L. & POL'Y 1, 2–3 (2014) (“While multiple factors have 
contributed to mass incarceration, the charging and disposition choices of 
prosecutors in the state courts is probably the most important among those causes. 
Prosecutors charge a greater percentage of arrestees with crimes serious enough to 
result in a prison or jail term, and those prosecutor decisions drive up the 
incarceration rate.”) (citing John Pfaff, The Myths and Realities of Correctional 
Severity: Evidence from the National Corrections Reporting Program, 13 AM. L. & 
ECON. REV. 491 (2011)). See also Berman, supra note 43, at 59 (“A massive 
increase in incarceration levels in recent decades, fueled in large part by the so-
called “war on drugs,” has made America the world’s leader in imprisonment by a 
wide margin.”) 
68 Rachel E. Barkow, Separation of Powers and the Criminal Law, 58 STAN. L. REV. 
989, 1027 (2006) (“Without judicial oversight to speak of or any internal constraints, 
the potential for arbitrary enforcement is high. Prosecutors need not treat similar 
cases similarly for purposes of plea bargaining, and they need not explain why they 
agreed to reach a deal with one defendant but refused to do so with another 
defendant guilty of the same crime.”) 
69 Barkow, supra note 64.  
70 As one scholar has explained:  
While all these instances of nonenforcement provoked controversy, 
structural forces may well explain why recent Presidents have so frequently 
resorted to nonenforcement rather than seeking a change in law. In an era of 
partisan polarization and legislative gridlock, Presidents often cannot count 
on Congress to develop legislative solutions to perceived problems, or even 
to negotiate over such solutions in good faith. Nevertheless, the public 
increasingly holds the President accountable for all failures of national 
policy. Reliance on all forms of executive authority, without resort to 
Congress, thus becomes a nearly irresistible temptation for modern 
Presidents. 
Zachary S. Price, Enforcement Discretion and Executive Duty, 67 VAND. L. REV. 
671, 686-87 (2014). 
71 As one scholar has noted, while the ability to grant clemency “is not among the 
most awesome powers of the American Chief Executive; it is, at best, his most 
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better seen as a means of ensuring a just outcome in specific cases.72 
As Alexander Hamilton noted when defending presidential pardon 
powers, “[t]he criminal code of every country partakes so much of 
necessary severity, that without an easy access to exceptions in favor 
of unfortunate guilt, justice would wear a countenance too sanguinary 
and cruel.”73 
 
 While none of these principal critiques seeking to undermine 
the legitimacy of the clemency initiative have merit, they do reflect an 
underlying angst about the seemingly unbridled use of power by the 
Executive branch.  This legitimate concern is alleviated to some extent 
by the operation of three constraints.  First, the President’s pardon 
powers are subject to some, albeit modest, constitutional limitations.74  
Second, insofar as Presidents are concerned about their reelection, the 
electoral prospects of future candidates of their political party, or even 
the future legacy of their Presidency, there is an organic political 
constraint on the President’s pardon powers.75  Third, and perhaps 
most salient, is the President’s character.  As the Chief Justice 
Marshall observed, “[b]y the constitution of the United States, the 
President is invested with certain important political powers, in the 
exercise of which he is to use his own discretion, and is accountable 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
benevolent power.” William F. Duker, The President's Power to Pardon: A 
Constitutional History, 18 WM. & MARY L. REV. 475 (1977). 
72 Barkow, supra note 64. (“Clemency is thus a uniquely powerful weapon in the 
President's toolkit for making sure that enforcement reflects his or her priorities and 
values, and ensuring that his or her agents do not contradict those views in a manner 
that overly restricts liberty. It is a flexible tool that can be used on an individualized 
basis or as a wholesale matter, to correct applications of law across a range of cases 
that share certain attributes. Clemency may also be granted on a conditional basis to 
correct particularly pernicious collateral consequences of convictions.”). 
73 Price, supra note 70, at 701; Rachel E. Barkow & Mark Osler, Restructuring 
Clemency: The Cost of Ignoring Clemency and a Plan for Renewal, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 1, 17 (2015) (“With striking foresight, the Framers identified the specific 
problem that could be countermanded through the pardon power: the inevitable 
instinct of legislators, propelled by political impulse, to create harsh sentences 
against unpopular criminals that would prove disproportionate in particular cases.”). 
74 See Mark Strasser, The Limits of the Clemency Power on Pardons, Retributivists, 
and the United States Constitution, 41 BRANDEIS L.J. 85 (2002); Harold J. Krent, 
Conditioning the President's Conditional Pardon Power, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1665 
(2001). 
75 See Jeffrey Crouch, The President's Power To Commute: Is It Still Relevant?, 9 U. 
ST. THOMAS L.J. 681 (2012); Laura Kalman, Gerald Ford, the Nixon Pardon, and 
the Rise of the Right, 58 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 349 (2010).  
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only to his country in his political character, and to his own 
conscience.”76  As unsatisfying an answer as it may be in the hyper-
partisan environment that defines our current politics, the principles, 
values and good judgment of the person holding the Office of the 
President serve as the best check against the abuse of the pardon 
power.77 
 
CONCLUSION 
 
President Obama’s clemency initiative has the potential to affect the 
cases of several thousand federal inmates prior to the end of the 
President’s term.  And as a model for future presidents, it has an even 
greater long term potential impact on the federal criminal justice 
system.  
 
 However, while the attacks on the legitimacy of the President’s 
actions are unfounded, the clemency initiative is hobbled by 
significant design and practical constraints.  The poor execution of the 
clemency initiative may leave un-rectified, unwarranted outcomes 
from an overly harsh criminal justice system in which the 
prosecutorial choices in charging, plea bargaining, and sentencing 
have resulted in arguably unjust outcomes.  
 
 Despite bipartisan calls for clemency,78 for example, Weldon 
Angelos, “a first-time offender convicted of selling $350 worth of 
marijuana on three occasions, while also possessing firearms,”79 
remains imprisoned after having been sentenced to a term of 55 years.  
Judge Paul G. Cassell, who sentenced Angelos, observed that 
recidivists and persons convicted of serious crimes as aircraft 
hijacking, murder and rape would have received lesser sentences than 
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Don't Know) About the Pardon Power, 9 U. ST. THOMAS L.J. 783 (2013); Bernadette 
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78 See Sari Horwitz, Unlikely Allies, WASH. POST. (Aug. 15, 2015), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/08/15/clemency-the-issue-that-
obama-and-the-koch-brothers-actually-agree-on/. 
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Angelos, and called his punishment “unjust, cruel, and even 
irrational.”80  
 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
80 United States v. Angelos, 345 F.Supp.2d 1227, 1230 (D. Utah 2004). 
